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Abstract We present a new, distributed method to compute approximate
Nash equilibria in bimatrix games. In contrast to previous approaches that
analyze the two payoff matrices at the same time (for example, by solving a
single LP that combines the two players’ payoffs), our algorithm first solves
two independent LPs, each of which is derived from one of the two payoff ma-
trices, and then computes an approximate Nash equilibrium using only lim-
ited communication between the players. Our method gives improved bounds
on the complexity of computing approximate Nash equilibria in a number of
different settings. Firstly, it gives a polynomial-time algorithm for comput-
ing approximate well supported Nash equilibria (WSNE) that always finds a
0.6528-WSNE, beating the previous best guarantee of 0.6608. Secondly, since
our algorithm solves the two LPs separately, it can be applied to give an
improved bound in the limited communication setting, giving a randomized
expected-polynomial-time algorithm that uses poly-logarithmic communica-
tion and finds a 0.6528-WSNE, which beats the previous best known guaran-
tee of 0.732. It can also be applied to the case of approximate Nash equilibria,
where we obtain a randomized expected-polynomial-time algorithm that uses
poly-logarithmic communication and always finds a 0.382-approximate Nash
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equilibrium, which improves the previous best guarantee of 0.438. Finally, the
method can also be applied in the query complexity setting to give an algo-
rithm that makes O(n log n) payoff queries and always finds a 0.6528-WSNE,
which improves the previous best known guarantee of 2/3.
1 Introduction
The problem of finding equilibria in non-cooperative games is a central problem
in game theory. Nash’s seminal theorem proved that every finite normal-form
game has at least one Nash equilibrium [18], and this raises the natural question
of whether we can find one efficiently. After several years of extensive research,
it was shown that finding a Nash equilibrium is PPAD-complete [7] even for
two-player bimatrix games [3], which is considered to be strong evidence that
there is no polynomial-time algorithm for this problem.
Approximate equilibria. The fact that computing an exact Nash equilib-
rium of a bimatrix game is unlikely to be tractable, has led to the study of
approximate Nash equilibria. There are two natural notions of approximate
equilibrium, both of which will be studied in this paper. An -approximate
Nash equilibrium (-NE) is a pair of strategies in which neither player can
increase their expected payoff by more than  by unilaterally deviating from
their assigned strategy. An -well-supported Nash equilibrium (-WSNE) is a
pair of strategies in which both players only place probability on strategies
whose payoff is within  of the best response payoff. Every -WSNE is an -NE
but the converse does not hold, so a WSNE is a more restrictive notion.
Approximate Nash equilibria are the more well studied of the two concepts.
A line of work has studied the best guarantee that can be achieved in poly-
nomial time [2, 6, 8]. The best algorithm known so far is the gradient descent
method of Tsaknakis and Spirakis [20] that finds a 0.3393-NE in polynomial
time, and examples upon which the algorithm finds no better than a 0.3385-NE
have been found [12]. On the other hand, progress on computing approximate-
well-supported Nash equilibria has been less forthcoming. The first correct
algorithm was provided by Kontogiannis and Spirakis [16] (which shall hence-
forth be referred to as the KS algorithm), who gave a polynomial time algo-
rithm for finding a 23 -WSNE. This was later slightly improved by Fearnley
et al. [10] (whose algorithm we shall refer to as the FGSS-algorithm), who
gave a new polynomial-time algorithm that extends the KS algorithm and
finds a 0.6608-WSNE; prior to this work, this was the best known approxima-
tion guarantee for WSNEs. For the special case of symmetric games, there is
a polynomial-time algorithm for finding a 12 + δ-WSNE [5].
Previously, it was considered a strong possibility that there is a PTAS for
this problem (either for finding an -NE or -WSNE, since their complexity
is polynomially related). A very recent result of Rubinstein [19] sheds serious
doubt on this possibility. EndOfTheLine is the canonical problem that de-
fines the complexity class PPAD. The “Exponential Time Hypothesis” (ETH)
for EndOfTheLine says that any algorithm that solves an EndOfTheLine
Distributed Methods for Computing Approximate Equilibria. 3
instance with n-bit circuits, requires 2Ω˜(n) time. Rubinstein’s result says that,
subject to the ETH for EndOfTheLine, there exists a constant, but so far
undetermined, ∗, such that for  < ∗, every algorithm for finding an -NE
takes quasi-polynomial time, so the quasi-PTAS of Lipton et al. [17] is optimal.
Communication complexity. Approximate Nash equilibria can also be stud-
ied from the communication complexity point of view, which captures the
amount of communication the players need to find a good approximate Nash
equilibrium. It models a natural scenario where the two players each know
their own payoff matrix, but do not know their opponent’s payoff matrix. The
players must then follow a communication protocol that eventually produces
strategies for both players. The goal is to design a protocol that produces a
sufficiently good -NE or -WSNE while also minimizing the amount of com-
munication between the two players.
Communication complexity of equilibria in games has been studied in pre-
vious works [4, 15]. The recent paper of Goldberg and Pastink [13] initiated
the study of communication complexity in the bimatrix game setting. There
they showed Θ(n2) communication is required to find an exact Nash equilib-
rium of an n × n bimatrix game. Since these games have Θ(n2) payoffs in
total, this implies that there is no communication-efficient protocol for find-
ing exact Nash equilibria in bimatrix games. For approximate equilibria, they
showed that one can find a 34 -NE without any communication, and that in the
no-communication setting, finding a 12 -NE is impossible. Motivated by these
positive and negative results, they focused on the most interesting setting,
which allows only a polylogarithmic (in n) number of bits to be exchanged
between the players. They showed that one can compute 0.438-NE and 0.732-
WSNE in this context. Recently Babichenko and Rubinstein [1] proved the
first lower bounds for the communication complexity of -NE. They proved
that for bimatrix games there is constant  > 0 such that polynomial com-
munication (in n) is needed in order to compute an -NE. Furthermore, they
showed that in N -player binary-action games there exists a constant  > 0
such that 2Ω(N) communication is needed for computing an -NE.
Query complexity. The payoff query model is motivated by practical ap-
plications of game theory. It is often the case that we know that there is a
game to be solved, but we do not know what the payoffs are, and in order to
discover the payoffs, we would have to play the game. This may be costly, so
it is natural to ask whether we can find an equilibrium while minimizing the
number of experiments that we must perform.
Payoff queries model this situation. In the payoff query model we are told
the structure of the game, i.e., the strategy space, but we are not told the
payoffs. We can then make payoff queries, where we propose a pure strategy
profile, and we are told the payoff of each player under that strategy profile.
Our task is to compute an equilibrium of the game while minimizing the
number of payoff queries that we make.
The study of query complexity in bimatrix games was initiated by Fearn-
ley et al. [11], who gave a deterministic algorithm for finding a 12 -NE using
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2n−1 payoff queries. A subsequent paper of Fearnley and Savani [9] showed a
number of further results. Firstly, they showed an Ω(n2) lower bound on the
query complexity of finding an -NE with  < 12 , which combined with the
result above, gives a complete view of the deterministic query complexity of
approximate Nash equilibria in bimatrix games. They then give a randomized
algorithm that finds a ( 3−
√
5
2 + )-NE using O(
n·logn
2 ) queries, and a random-
ized algorithm that finds a (23 + )-WSNE using O(
n·logn
4 ) queries.
Our contribution. In this paper we introduce a distributed technique that al-
lows us to efficiently compute -NE and -WSNE using limited communication
between the players.
Traditional methods for computing WSNEs have used an LP based ap-
proach that, when used on a bimatrix game (R,C), solves the zero-sum game
(R − C,C − R). The KS algorithm uses the fact that if there is no pure 23 -
WSNE, then the solution to this zero-sum game is a 23 -WSNE. The slight
improvement of the FGSS-algorithm [10] to 0.6608 was obtained by adding
two further methods to the KS algorithm: if the KS algorithm does not pro-
duce a 0.6608-WSNE, then either there is a 2× 2 matching pennies sub-game
that is 0.6608-WSNE or the strategies from the zero-sum game can be im-
proved by shifting the probabilities of both players within their supports in
order to produce a 0.6608-WSNE.
In this paper, we take a different approach. We first show that the bound
of 23 can be matched using a pair of distributed LPs. Given a bimatrix game
(R,C), we solve the two zero-sum games (R,−R) and (−C,C), and then give
a simple procedure that we call the base algorithm, which uses the solutions
to these games to produce a 23 -WSNE of (R,C). Goldberg and Pastink [13]
also considered this pair of LPs, but their algorithm only produces a 0.732-
WSNE. We then show that the base algorithm can be improved by applying
the probability-shifting and matching-pennies ideas from the FGSS-algorithm.
That is, if the base algorithm fails to find a 0.6528-WSNE, then a 0.6528-
WSNE can be obtained either by shifting the probabilities of one of the two
players, or by identifying a 2 × 2 sub-game. This gives a polynomial-time
algorithm that computes a 0.6528-WSNE, which provides the best known ap-
proximation guarantees for WSNEs.
It is worth pointing out that, while these techniques are thematically sim-
ilar to the ones used by the FGSS-algorithm, the actual implementation is
significantly different. The FGSS-algorithm attempts to improve the strate-
gies by shifting probabilities within the supports of the strategies returned by
the two player game, with the goal of reducing the other player’s payoff. In
our algorithm, we shift probabilities away from bad strategies in order to im-
prove that player’s payoff. This type of analysis is possible because the base
algorithm produces a strategy profile in which one of the two players plays
a pure strategy, which simplifies the analysis that we need to carry out. On
the other hand, the KS-algorithm can produce strategies in which both play-
ers play many strategies, and so the analysis used for the FGSS-algorithm is
necessarily more complicated.
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Complexity setting Payoffs Solution Previous best approximation This paper
Computational (polynomial) [0, 1] -WSNE 0.6608 [10] 0.6528
Query (n · log(n) queries) [0, 1] -WSNE 0.6667 [9] 0.6528 + 
Communication (polylogarithmic) [0, 1] -WSNE 0.7321 [13] 0.6528 + 
Communication (polylogarithmic) {0, 1} -WSNE 0.7321 [13] 0.5 + 
Communication (polylogarithmic) [0, 1] -NE 0.4384 [13] 0.3820 + 
Table 1 Comparison of our approximation guarantees with the previous best-known guar-
antees.
Since our algorithm solves the two LPs separately, it can be used to improve
upon the best known algorithms in the limited communication setting. This is
because no communication is required for the row player to solve (R,−R) and
the column player to solve (−C,C). The players can then carry out the rest of
the algorithm using only poly-logarithmic communication. Hence, we obtain
a randomized expected-polynomial-time algorithm that uses poly-logarithmic
communication and finds a 0.6528-WSNE. Moreover, the base algorithm can
be implemented as a communication efficient algorithm for finding a ( 12 + )-
WSNE in a win-lose bimatrix game, where all payoffs are either 0 or 1.
The algorithm can also be used to beat the best known bound in the query
complexity setting. It has already been shown by Goldberg and Roth [14] that
an -NE of a zero-sum game can be found by a randomized algorithm that
uses O(n logn2 ) payoff queries. Since the rest of the steps used by our algorithm
can also be carried out using O(n log n) payoff queries, this gives us a query
efficient algorithm for finding a 0.6528-WSNE.
We also show that the base algorithm can be adapted to find a 3−
√
5
2 -NE
in a bimatrix game. Once again, this can be implemented in a communication
efficient manner, and so we obtain an algorithm that computes a ( 3−
√
5
2 +)-NE
(i.e., 0.382-NE) using only poly-logarithmic communication.
Finally, we provide a lower bound against the base algorithm that is essen-
tially tight, namely within 0.0034 of the theoretical upper bound.
2 Preliminaries
Bimatrix games. Throughout, we use [n] to denote the set {1, 2, . . . , n}. An
n × n bimatrix game is a pair (R,C) of two n × n matrices: R gives payoffs
for the row player and C gives the payoffs for the column player. We make
the standard assumption that all payoffs lie in the range [0, 1]. For simplicity,
as in [13], we assume that each payoff has constant bit-length1. A win-lose
bimatrix game has all payoffs in {0, 1}.
Each player has n pure strategies. To play the game, both players simul-
taneously select a pure strategy: the row player selects a row i ∈ [n], and the
1 The statements of our results can easily be extended to the case where all payoffs can be
represented using b bits by including a factor b in all our communication complexity bounds.
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column player selects a column j ∈ [n]. The row player then receives payoff
Ri,j , and the column player receives payoff Ci,j .
A mixed strategy is a probability distribution over [n]. We denote a mixed
strategy for the row player as a vector x of length n, such that xi is the
probability that the row player assigns to pure strategy i. A mixed strategy
of the column player is a vector y of length n, with the same interpretation.
Given a mixed strategy x for either player, the support of x is the set of pure
strategies i with xi > 0. If x and y are mixed strategies for the row and
the column player, respectively, then we call (x,y) a mixed strategy profile.
The expected payoff for the row player under strategy profile (x,y) is given
by xTRy and for the column player by xTCy. We denote the support of
a strategy x as supp(x), which gives the set of pure strategies i such that
xi > 0.
Nash equilibria. Let y be a mixed strategy for the column player. The set of
pure best responses against y for the row player is the set of pure strategies that
maximize the payoff against y. More formally, a pure strategy i ∈ [n] is a best
response against y if, for all pure strategies i′ ∈ [n] we have: ∑j∈[n] yj ·Ri,j ≥∑
j∈[n] yj ·Ri′,j . Column player best responses are defined analogously.
A mixed strategy profile (x,y) is a mixed Nash equilibrium if every pure
strategy in supp(x) is a best response against y, and every pure strategy in
supp(y) is a best response against x. Nash [18] showed that all bimatrix games
have a mixed Nash equilibrium.
Approximate equilibria. There are two commonly studied notions of ap-
proximate equilibrium, and we consider both of them in this paper. The first
notion is of an -approximate Nash equilibrium (-NE), which weakens the re-
quirement that a player’s expected payoff should be equal to their best response
payoff. Formally, given a strategy profile (x,y), we define the regret suffered
by the row player to be the difference between the best response payoff and
actual payoff, i.e.,
max
i∈[n]
(
(R · y)i
)− xT ·R · y.
The term R · y is a vector where the i-th entry of the vector, (R · y)i, corre-
sponds the payoff the row player gets from playing his i-th pure strategy when
the column player plays y. Hence, the maximum over this vector is the best
response payoff for the row player. The term xT · R · y encodes the expected
payoff to the row player under the strategy profile (x,y).
Regret for the column player is defined analogously. We have that (x,y) is
an -NE if and only if both players have regret less than or equal to .
The other notion is of an -approximate-well-supported equilibrium (-
WSNE), which weakens the requirement that players only place probability
on best response strategies. Given a strategy profile (x,y) and a pure strategy
j ∈ [n], we say that j is an -best-response for the row player if
max
i∈[n]
(
(R · y)i
)− (R · y)j ≤ .
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An -WSNE requires that both players only place probability on -best-responses.
In an -WSNE both players place probability only on -best-responses. For-
mally, the row player’s pure strategy regret under (x,y) is defined to be
max
i∈[n]
(
(R · y)i
)− min
i∈supp(x)
(
(R · y)i
)
.
Pure strategy regret for the column player is defined analogously. A strategy
profile (x,y) is an -WSNE if both players have pure strategy regret less than
or equal to .
Communication complexity. We consider the communication model for
bimatrix games introduced by Goldberg and Pastink [13]. In this model, both
players know the payoffs in their own payoff matrix, but do not know the
payoffs in their opponent’s matrix. The players then follow an algorithm that
uses a number of communication rounds, where in each round they exchange a
single bit of information. Between each communication round, the players are
permitted to perform arbitrary randomized computations (although it should
be noted that, in this paper, the players will only perform polynomial-time
computations) using their payoff matrix, and the bits that they have received
so far. At the end of the algorithm, the row player outputs a mixed strategy
x, and the column player outputs a mixed strategy y. The goal is to produce
a strategy profile (x,y) that is an -NE or -WSNE for a sufficiently small 
while limiting the number of communication rounds used by the algorithm.
The algorithms given in this paper will use at most O(log2 n) communication
rounds. In order to achieve this, we use the following result of Goldberg and
Pastink [13].
Lemma 1 ([13]) Given a mixed strategy x for the row-player and an  > 0,
there is a randomized expected-polynomial-time algorithm that uses O( log
2 n
2 )-
communication to transmit a strategy xs to the column player where |supp(xs)| ∈
O( logn2 ) and for every strategy i ∈ [n] we have:
|(xT ·R)i − (xTs ·R)i| ≤ .
The algorithm uses the well-known sampling technique of Lipton, Markakis,
and Mehta to construct the strategy xs, so for this reason we will call the strat-
egy xs the sampled strategy from x. Since this strategy has a logarithmically
sized support, it can be transmitted by sending O( logn2 ) strategy indexes, each
of which can be represented using log n bits. By symmetry, the algorithm can
obviously also be used to transmit approximations of column player strategies
to the row player.
Query complexity. In the query complexity setting, the algorithm knows
that the players will play an n × n game (R,C), but it does not know any
of the entries of R or C. These payoffs are obtained using payoff queries in
which the algorithm proposes a pure strategy profile (i, j), and then it is told
the value of Rij and Cij . After each payoff query, the algorithm can make
arbitrary computations (although, again, in this paper the algorithms that
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we consider take polynomial time) in order to decide the next pure strategy
profile to query. After making a sequence of payoff queries, the algorithm then
outputs a mixed strategy profile (x,y). Again, the goal is to ensure that this
strategy profile is an -NE or -WSNE, while minimizing the number of queries
made overall.
There are two results that we will use for this setting. Goldberg and Roth
[14] have given a randomized algorithm that, with high probability, finds an -
NE of a zero-sum game using O(n·logn2 ) payoff queries. Given a mixed strategy
profile (x,y), an -approximate payoff vector for the row player is a vector v
such that, for all i ∈ [n] we have |vi − (R · y)i| ≤ . Approximate payoff
vectors for the column player are defined symmetrically. Fearnley and Savani
[9] observed that there is a randomized algorithm that when given the strategy
profile (x,y), finds approximate payoff vectors for both players using O(n·logn2 )
payoff queries and that succeeds with high probability. We summarise these
two results in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 ([9, 14]) Given an n×n zero-sum bimatrix game, with probability
at least (1− n− 18 )(1− 2n )2, we can compute an -Nash equilibrium (x,y), and
-approximate payoff vectors for both players under (x,y), using O(n·logn2 )
payoff queries.
3 The base algorithm
In this section, we introduce the base algorithm, which provides a simple way to
find a 23 -WSNE. We present this algorithm separately for three reasons. Firstly,
the algorithm is interesting in its own right, since it provides a relatively
straightforward method for finding a 23 -WSNE that is quite different from
the technique used in the KS-algorithm. Secondly, our algorithm for finding a
0.6528-WSNE will build on this algorithm and replace its final step with two
more involved procedures. Thirdly, at the end of this section, we show how
this algorithm can be adapted to provide a communication efficient way to
find a (0.5 + )-WSNE in win-lose games.
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Algorithm 1
1. Solve the zero-sum games (R,−R) and (−C,C).
– Let (x∗,y∗) be a NE of (R,−R), and let (xˆ, yˆ) be a NE of
(−C,C).
– Let vr be the value secured by x
∗ in (R,−R), and let vc be
the value secured by yˆ in (−C,C). Without loss of generality
assume that vc ≤ vr.
2. If vr ≤ 2/3, then return (xˆ,y∗).
3. If for all j ∈ [n] it holds that CTj · x∗ ≤ 2/3, then return (x∗,y∗).
4. Otherwise:
– Let j∗ be a pure best response to x∗.
– Find a row i such that Rij∗ > 1/3 and Cij∗ > 1/3.
– Return (i, j∗).
We argue that this algorithm is correct. For that, we must prove that the
row i used in Step 4 actually exists.
Lemma 3 If Algorithm 1 reaches Step 4, then there exists a row i such that
Rij∗ > 1/3 and Cij∗ > 1/3.
Proof Let i be a row sampled from x∗. We will show that there is a positive
probability that row i satisfies the desired properties.
We begin by showing that the probability that Pr(Rij∗ ≤ 13 ) < 0.5. Let the
random variable T = 1− Rij∗ , where i is chosen according to the probability
distribution x∗. Note that E[Rij∗ ] = (x∗R)j . Since vr > 23 , we claim that
E[T ] < 13 . This follows from the fact that x
∗ is a minmax strategy for the
row player, and thus it guarantees a payoff more than 2/3 against any pure
strategy of the column player.
Thus, applying Markov’s inequality we obtain:
Pr(T ≥ 2
3
) ≤ E[T ]
2/3
< 0.5.
Since Pr(Rij∗ ≤ 13 ) = Pr(T ≥ 23 ) we can therefore conclude that Pr(Rij∗ ≤
1
3 ) < 0.5. The exact same technique can be used to prove that Pr(Cij∗ ≤ 13 ) <
0.5, by using the fact that CTj∗ · x∗ > 23 .
We can now apply the union bound to argue that:
Pr(Rij∗ ≤ 1
3
or Cij∗ ≤ 1
3
) < 1.
Hence, there is positive probability that row i satisfies Rij∗ >
1
3 and Cij∗ >
1
3 ,
so such a row must exist. uunionsq
We now argue that the algorithm always produces a 23 -WSNE. There are
three possible strategy profiles that can be returned by the algorithm, which
we consider individually.
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The algorithm returns in Step 2: Since vc ≤ vr by assumption, and since
vr ≤ 23 , we have that (R · y∗)i ≤ 23 for every row i, and ((xˆ)T ·C)j ≤ 23 for
every column j. So, both players can have pure strategy regret at most 23
in (xˆ,y∗), and thus this profile is a 23 -WSNE.
The algorithm returns in Step 3: Much like in the previous case, when
the column player plays y∗, the row player can have pure strategy regret at
most 23 ; observe that in this case the row player actually suffers zero regret
since x∗ is a best response against y∗. The requirement that CTj x
∗ ≤ 23
also ensures that the column player has pure strategy regret at most 23 .
Thus, we have that (x∗,y∗) is a 23 -WSNE.
The algorithm returns in Step 4: Both players have payoff at least 13 un-
der (i, j∗) for the sole strategy in their respective supports. Hence, the
maximum pure strategy regret that can be suffered by a player is 1− 13 = 23 .
Observe that the zero-sum games solved in Step 1 can be solved via linear
programming, and so the algorithm runs in polynomial time. Therefore, we
have shown the following.
Theorem 4 Algorithm 1 always produces a 23 -WSNE in polynomial time.
3.1 Win-lose games
The base algorithm can be adapted to provide a communication efficient
method for finding a (0.5 + )-WSNE in win-lose games. In brief, the algo-
rithm can be modified to find a 0.5-WSNE in a win-lose game by making
Steps 2 and 3 check against the threshold of 0.5. It can then be shown that
if these steps fail, then there exists a pure Nash equilibrium in column j∗.
This can then be implemented as a communication efficient protocol using the
algorithm from Lemma 1.
Formally, we will study the following simple modification of Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 2
1. Solve the zero-sum games (R,−R) and (−C,C).
– Let (x∗,y∗) be a NE of (R,−R), and let (xˆ, yˆ) be a NE of
(C,−C).
– Let vr be the value secured by x
∗ in (R,−R), and let vc be
the value secured by yˆ in (−C,C). Without loss of generality
assume that vc ≤ vr.
2. If vr ≤ 0.5, then return (xˆ,y∗).
3. If for all j ∈ [n] it holds that CTj · x∗ ≤ 0.5, then return (x∗,y∗).
4. Otherwise:
– Let j∗ be a pure best response to x∗.
– Find a row i such that Rij∗ = 1 and Cij = 1.
– Return (i, j∗).
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We will show that this algorithm always finds a 0.5-WSNE in a win-lose
game. Firstly, we show that the pure Nash equilibrium found in Step 4 always
exists. The following lemma is similar to Lemma 3, but exploits the fact that
the game is win-lose to obtain a stronger conclusion.
Lemma 5 If Algorithm 2 is applied to a win-lose game, and it reaches Step 4,
then there exists a row i ∈ supp(x∗) such that Rij∗ = 1 and Cij∗ = 1.
Proof Let i be a row sampled from x∗. We will show that there is a positive
probability that row i satisfies the desired properties.
We begin by showing that the probability that Pr(Rij∗ = 0) < 0.5. Let the
random variable T = 1 − Rij∗ . Since vr > 12 , we have that E[T ] < 0.5. Thus,
applying Markov’s inequality we obtain:
Pr(T ≥ 1) ≤ E[T ]
1
< 0.5.
Since Pr(Rij∗ = 0) = Pr(T ≥ 1) we can therefore conclude that Pr(Rij∗ = 0) <
0.5. The exact same technique can be used to prove that Pr(Cij∗ = 0) < 0.5,
by using the fact that CTj∗ · x∗ > 0.5.
We can now apply the union bound to argue that:
Pr(Rij∗ = 0 or Cij∗ = 0) < 1.
Hence, there is positive probability that row i satisfies Rij∗ > 0 and Cij∗ > 0,
so such a row must exist. The final step is to observe that, since the game is
win-lose, we have that Rij∗ > 0 implies Rij∗ = 1, and that Cij∗ > 0 implies
Cij∗ = 1. uunionsq
We now prove that the algorithm always finds a 0.5-WSNE. The reasoning
is very similar to the analysis of the base algorithm. The strategy profiles
returned by Steps 2 and 3 are 0.5-WSNEs by the same reasoning that was
given for the base algorithm. Step 4 always returns a pure Nash equilibrium,
which is a 0-WSNE.
Communication complexity. We now show that Algorithm 2 can be im-
plemented in a communication efficient way.
The zero-sum games in Step 1 can be solved by the two players indepen-
dently without any communication. Then, the players exchange vr and vs
using O(log n) rounds of communication. If both vr and vs are smaller than
0.5, then the players use the algorithm from Lemma 1 to communicate xˆs and
y∗s between themselves, using the parameter

2 in place of . Since the payoffs
under the sampled strategies are within 2 of the originals, we have that all
pure strategies have payoff less than or equal to 0.5 +  under (xˆs,y
∗
s), so this
strategy profile is a (0.5 + )-WSNE.
We will assume from now on that vr > vc. If the algorithm reaches Step 3,
then the row player uses the algorithm of Lemma 1 to communicate x∗s to the
column player. The column player then computes a best response j∗s against
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x∗s, and checks whether the payoff of j
∗
s against x
∗
s is less than or equal to
0.5 + . If so, then the players output (x∗s, j
∗
s), which is a (0.5 + )-WSNE
Otherwise, we claim that there is a pure strategy i ∈ supp(x∗s) such that
(i, j∗s) is a pure Nash equilibrium. This can be shown by observing that the
expected payoff of x∗s against j
∗
s is at least 0.5− , while the expected payoff of
j∗s against x
∗
s is at least 0.5 + . Repeating the proof of Lemma 5 using these
inequalities then shows that the pure Nash equilibrium does indeed exist.
Since supp(x∗s) has logarithmic size, the row player can simply transmit to the
column player all payoffs Rij∗s for which i ∈ supp(x∗s), and the column player
can then send back a row corresponding to a pure Nash equilibrium.
In conclusion, we have shown the following theorem.
Theorem 6 For every win-lose game and  > 0, there is a randomized expected-
polynomial-time algorithm that finds a (0.5 + )-WSNE with O
(
log2 n
2
)
com-
munication.
4 An algorithm for finding a 0.6528-WSNE
In this section, we show how Algorithm 1 can be modified to produce a 0.6528-
WSNE.
Outline. Our algorithm replaces Step 4 of Algorithm 1 with a more involved
procedure. This procedure uses two techniques, that both find an -WSNE with
 < 23 . Firstly, we attempt to turn (x
∗, j∗) into a WSNE by shifting probabilities.
Observe that, since j∗ is a best response, the column player has a pure strategy
regret of 0 in (x∗, j∗). On the other hand, we have no guarantees about the
row player since x∗ might place a small amount of probability strategies with
payoff strictly less than 13 . However, since x
∗ achieves a high expected payoff
(due to Step 2,) it cannot place too much probability on these low payoff
strategies. Thus, the idea is to shift the probability that x∗ assigns to entries
of j∗ with payoff less than or equal to 13 to entries with payoff strictly greater
than 13 , and thus ensure that the row player’s pure strategy regret is below
2
3 .
Of course, this procedure will increase the pure strategy regret of the column
player, but if it is also below 23 once all probability has been shifted, then we
have found an -WSNE with  < 23 .
If shifting probabilities fails to find an -WSNE with  < 23 , then we show
that the game contains a matching pennies sub-game. More precisely, we show
that there exists a column j′, and rows b and s such that the 2× 2 sub-game
induced by j∗, j′, b, and s has the following form:
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@
@
I
II
b
s
j∗ j′
≈ 1 0
0 ≈ 1
0 ≈ 1
≈ 1 0
Thus, if both players play uniformly over their respective pair of strategies,
then j∗, j′, b, and s with have payoff ≈ 0.5, and so this yields an -WSNE with
 < 23 .
The algorithm. We now formalize this approach, and show that it always
finds an -WSNE with  < 23 . In order to quantify the precise  that we obtain,
we parametrise the algorithm by a variable z, which we constrain to be in the
range 0 ≤ z < 124 . With the exception of the matching pennies step, all other
steps of the algorithm will return a (23−z)-WSNE, while the matching pennies
step will return a ( 12 +f(z))-WSNE for some increasing function f . Optimizing
the trade off between 23−z and 12+f(z) then allows us to determine the quality
of WSNE found by our algorithm.
The algorithm is displayed as Algorithm 3. Steps 1, 2, and 3 are versions of
the corresponding steps from Algorithm 1, which have been adapted to produce
a ( 23 − z)-WSNE. Step 4 implements the probability shifting procedure, while
Step 5 finds a matching pennies sub-game.
Observe that the probabilities used in xmp and ymp are only well defined
when z ≤ 124 , because we have that 1−15z2−39z > 1 whenever z > 124 , which explains
our required upper bound on z.
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Algorithm 3
1. Solve the zero-sum games (R,−R) and (−C,C).
– Let (x∗,y∗) be a NE of (R,−R), and let (xˆ, yˆ) be a NE of (C,−C).
– Let vr be the value secured by x∗ in (R,−R), and let vc be the value secured
by yˆ in (−C,C). Without loss of generality assume that vc ≤ vr.
2. If vr ≤ 2/3− z, then return (xˆ,y∗).
3. If for all j ∈ [n] it holds that CTj x∗ ≤ 2/3− z, then return (x∗,y∗).
4. Otherwise:
– Let j∗ be a pure best response against x∗. Define:
S := {i ∈ supp(x∗) : Rij∗ < 1/3 + z}
B := supp(x∗) \ S
– Define the strategy xB as follows. For each i ∈ [n] we have:
(xB)i =
{
1
Pr(B)
· x∗i if i ∈ B
0 otherwise.
– If (xB
T · C)j∗ ≥ 13 + z, then return (xB, j∗).
5. Otherwise:
– Let j′ be a pure best response against xB.
– If there exists an i ∈ supp(x∗) such that (i, j∗) or (i, j′) is a pure ( 2
3
− z)-
WSNE, then return it.
– Find a row b ∈ B such that Rbj∗ > 1− 18z1+3z and Cbj′ > 1− 18z1+3z .
– Find a row s ∈ S such that Csj∗ > 1− 27z1+3z and Rsj′ > 1− 27z1+3z .
– Define the row player strategy xmp and the column player strategy ymp
as follows. For each i ∈ [n] we have:
xmpi =

1−24z
2−39z if i = b,
1−15z
2−39z if i = s,
0 otherwise.
ympi =

1−24z
2−39z if i = j
∗,
1−15z
2−39z if i = j
′,
0 otherwise.
– Return (xmp,ymp).
The correctness of Step 5. This step of the algorithm relies on the existence
of the rows b and s, which is shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 7 Suppose that the following conditions hold:
1. x∗ has payoff at least 23 − z against j∗.
2. j∗ has payoff at least 23 − z against x∗.
3. x∗ has payoff at least 23 − z against j′.
4. Neither j∗ nor j′ contains a pure ( 23 − z)-WSNE (i, j) with i ∈ supp(x∗).
Then, both of the following are true:
– There exists a row b ∈ B such that Rbj∗ > 1− 18z1+3z and Cbj′ > 1− 18z1+3z .
– There exists a row s ∈ S such that Csj∗ > 1− 27z1+3z and Rsj′ > 1− 27z1+3z .
Distributed Methods for Computing Approximate Equilibria. 15
We defer the proof of this lemma to Section 4.1. Observe that the precon-
ditions are indeed true if the Algorithm reaches Step 5. The first and third
conditions hold because, due to Step 2, we know that x∗ is a min-max strategy
that secures payoff at least vr >
2
3 − z. The second condition holds because
Step 3 ensures that the column player’s best response payoff is at least 23 − z.
The fourth condition holds because Step 5 explicitly checks for these pure
strategy profiles.
Quality of approximation. We now analyse the quality of WSNE our algo-
rithm produces. Steps 2, 3, 4, 5 each return a strategy profile. Observe that
Steps 2 and 3 are the same as the respective steps in the base algorithm, but
with the threshold changed from 23 to
2
3 − z. Hence, we can use the same
reasoning as we gave for the base algorithm to argue that these steps return
( 23 − z)-WSNE. We now consider the other two steps.
The algorithm returns in Step 4: By definition all rows r ∈ B satisfy
Rij∗ ≥ 13 + z, so since supp(xB) ⊆ B, the pure strategy regret of the
row player can be at most 1− ( 13 + z) = 23 − z. For the same reason, since
(xB
T · C)j∗ ≥ 13 + z holds, the pure strategy regret of the column player
can also be at 23 − z. Thus, the profile (xB, j∗) is a ( 23 − z)-WSNE.
The algorithm returns in Step 5: Since Rbj∗ > 1 − 18z1+3z , the payoff of b
when the column player plays ymp is at least:
1− 24z
2− 39z ·
(
1− 18z
1 + 3z
)
=
1− 39z + 360z2
2− 33z − 117z2
Similarly, since Rsj′ > 1 − 27z1+3z , the payoff of s when the column player
plays ymp is at least:
1− 15z
2− 39z ·
(
1− 27z
1 + 3z
)
=
1− 39z + 360z2
2− 33z − 117z2
In the same way, one can show that the payoffs of j∗ and j′ are also
1−39z+360z2
2−33z−117z2 when the row player plays xmp. Thus, we have that (xmp,ymp)
is a (1− 1−39z+360z22−33z−117z2 )-WSNE.
To find the optimal value for z, we need to find the largest value of z for which
the following inequality holds.
1− 1− 39z + 360z
2
2− 33z − 117z2 ≤
2
3
− z.
Setting the inequality to an equality and rearranging gives us a cubic poly-
nomial equation: 117 z3 + 432 z2 − 30 z + 13 = 0. Since the discriminant of
this polynomial is positive, this polynomial has three real roots, which can be
found via the trigonometric method. Only one of these roots lies in the range
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0 ≤ z < 124 , which is the following:
z =
1
117
√
3
(√
2434
√
3 cos
(
1
3
arctan
(
39
240073
√
9749
√
3
))
− 3
√
2434 sin
(
1
3
arctan
(
39
240073
√
9749
√
3
))
− 48
√
3
)
.
Thus, we get z ≈ 0.013906376, and we have found an algorithm that always
produces a 0.6528-WSNE. So we have the following theorem.
Theorem 8 There is a polynomial time algorithm that, given a bimatrix game,
finds a 0.6528-WSNE.
4.1 Proof of Lemma 7
In this section we assume that Steps 1 through 4 of our algorithm did not
return a (23 − z)-WSNE, and that neither j∗ nor j′ contained a pure ( 23 − z)-
WSNE. We show that, under these assumptions, the rows b and s required by
Step 5 do indeed exist.
Probability bounds. We begin by proving bounds on the amount of proba-
bility that x∗ can place on S and B. The following lemma uses the fact that
x∗ secures an expected payoff of at least 23 − z to give an upper bound on the
amount of probability that x∗ can place on S. To simplify notation, we use
Pr(B) to denote the probability assigned by x∗ to the rows in B, and we use
Pr(S) to denote the probability assigned by x∗ to the rows in S.
Lemma 9 Pr(S) ≤ 1+3z2−3z .
Proof We will prove our claim using Markov’s inequality. Consider the random
variable T = 1 − Rij∗ where i is sampled from x∗. Since by our assumption
the expected payoff of the row player is greater than 2/3 − z we get that
E(T ) ≤ 1/3 + z. If we apply Markov’s inequality we get
Pr(T ≥ 2
3
− z) ≤ E(T )2
3 − z
≤ 1 + 3z
2− 3z
which is the claimed result. uunionsq
Next we show an upper bound on Pr(B). Here we use the fact that j∗ does
not contain a ( 23 − z)-WSNE to argue that all column player payoffs in B are
smaller than 13 + z. Since we know that the payoff of j
∗ against x∗ is at least
2
3 − z, this can be used to prove a upper bound on the amount of probability
that x∗ assigns to B.
Lemma 10 Pr(B) ≤ 1+3z2−3z .
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Proof Since there is no i ∈ supp(x∗) such that (i, j∗) is a pure ( 23 − z)-WSNE,
and since each row i ∈ B satisfies Rij∗ ≥ 13 +z, we must have that Cij∗ < 13 +z
for every i ∈ B. By assumption we know that CTj∗x∗ > 2/3 − z. So, we have
the following inequality:
2
3
− z < Pr(B) · (1
3
+ z) +
(
1− Pr(B)) · 1.
Solving this inequality for Pr(B) gives the desired result. uunionsq
Payoff inequalities for j∗. We now show properties about the average payoff
obtained from the rows in B and S. Recall that xB was defined in Step 4 of
our algorithm, and that it denotes the normalization of the probability mass
assigned by x∗ to rows in B. The following lemma shows that the expected
payoff to the row player in the strategy profile (xB, j
∗) is close to 1.
Lemma 11 We have (xB
T ·R)j∗ > 1−6z1+3z .
Proof By definition we have that:
(xB
T ·R)j∗ = 1
Pr(B)
·
∑
i∈B
x∗i ·Rij∗ . (1)
We begin by deriving a lower bound for
∑
i∈B x
∗
i · Rij∗ . Using the fact that
x∗ secures an expected payoff of at least 2/3− z against j∗ and then applying
the bound from Lemma 9 gives:
2
3
− z <
∑
i∈B
x∗i ·Rij∗ + (
1
3
+ z) · Pr(S)
≤
∑
i∈B
x∗i ·Rij∗ + (
1
3
+ z) · 1 + 3z
2− 3z .
Hence we can conclude that:∑
i∈B
x∗i ·Rij∗ >
2
3
− z − 1
3
· (1 + 3z)
2
2− 3z
=
1− 6z
2− 3z .
Substituting this into Equation (1), along with the upper bound on Pr(B)
from Lemma 10, allows us to conclude that:
(xB
T ·R)j∗ ≥ 2− 3z
1 + 3z
·
∑
i∈B
x∗i ·Rij∗
>
2− 3z
1 + 3z
· 1− 6z
2− 3z
=
1− 6z
1 + 3z
.
uunionsq
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Next we would like to show a similar bound on the expected payoff to the
column player of the rows in S. To do this, we define xS to be the normalisation
of the probability mass that x∗ assigns to the rows in S. More formally, for
each i ∈ [n], we define:
(xS)i =
{
1
Pr(S) · x∗i if i ∈ S
0 otherwise.
The next lemma shows that the expected payoff to the column player in the
profile (xS, j
∗) is close to 1.
Lemma 12 We have (xS
T · C)j∗ > 1−6z1+3z .
Proof By definition we have that:
(xS
T · C)j∗ = 1
Pr(S)
·
∑
i∈S
x∗i · Cij∗ . (2)
We begin by deriving a lower bound for
∑
i∈S x
∗
i · Cij∗ . By assumption, we
know that CTj∗x
∗ > 2/3 − z. Moreover, since j∗ does not contain a ( 23 − z)-
WSNE we have that all rows i in B satisfy Cij∗ ≤ 1/3+z. If we combine these
facts that with Lemma 10 we obtain:
2
3
− z <
∑
i∈S
x∗i · Cij∗ + (
1
3
+ z) · Pr(B)
≤
∑
i∈S
x∗i · Cij∗ + (
1
3
+ z) · 1 + 3z
2− 3z .
Hence we can conclude that:∑
i∈S
x∗i · Cij∗ >
2
3
− z − 1
3
· (1 + 3z)
2
2− 3z
=
1− 6z
2− 3z .
Substituting this into Equation (2), along with the upper bound on Pr(S)
from Lemma 10, allows us to conclude that:
(xB
T ·R)j∗ ≥ 2− 3z
1 + 3z
·
∑
i∈B
x∗i ·Rij∗
>
2− 3z
1 + 3z
· 1− 6z
2− 3z
=
1− 6z
1 + 3z
.
uunionsq
Distributed Methods for Computing Approximate Equilibria. 19
Payoff inequalities for j′. We now want to prove similar inequalities for the
column j′. The next lemma shows that the expected payoff for the column
player in the profile (xB, j
′) is close to 1. This is achieved by first showing a
lower bound on the payoff to the column player in the profile (xB, j
∗), and
then using the fact that j∗ is not a ( 23 − z)-best-response against xB, and that
j′ is a best response against xB.
Lemma 13 We have (xB
T · C)j′ > 1−6z1+3z .
Proof We first establish a lower bound on (xB
T ·C)j∗ . By assumption, we know
that CTj∗x
∗ > 2/3− z. Using this fact, along with the bounds from Lemmas 9
and 10 gives:
2
3
− z < Pr(B) · (xBT · C)j∗ + Pr(S) · 1
≤ 1 + 3z
2− 3z · (xB
T · C)j∗ + 1 + 3z
2− 3z .
Solving this inequality for (xB
T · C)j∗ yields:
(xB
T · C)j∗ > 1
3
· 1− 21z + 9z
2
1 + 3z
.
Now we can prove the lower bound on (xB
T ·C)j′ . Since j∗ is not a ( 23 −z)-
best-response against xB, and since j
′ is a best response against xB we obtain:
(xB
T · C)j′ > (xBT · C)j∗ + 2
3
− z
(xB
T · C)j′ > 1
3
· 1− 21z + 9z
2
1 + 3z
+
2
3
− z
=
1− 6z
1 + 3z
.
uunionsq
The only remaining inequality that we require is a lower bound on the
expected payoff to the row player in the profile (xS, j
′). However, before we
can do this, we must first prove an upper bound on the expected payoff to
the row player in (xB, j
′), which we do in the following lemma. Here we first
prove that most of the probability mass of xB is placed on rows i in which
Cij′ >
1
3 + z, which when combined with the fact that there is no i ∈ supp(x∗)
such that (i, j′) is a pure ( 23 − z)-WSNE, is sufficient to provide an upper
bound.
Lemma 14 We have (xB
T ·R)j′ < 13 · 1+33z+9z
2
1+3z .
Proof We begin by proving an upper bound on the amount of probability mass
assigned by xB to rows i with Cij′ <
1
3 + z. Let T = 1 − Cij′ be a random
variable where the row i is sampled according to xB. Lemma 13 implies that:
E[T ] < 1− 1− 6z
1 + 3z
=
9z
1 + 3z
.
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Observe that Pr(T ≥ 1− ( 13 + z)) = Pr(T ≥ 23 − z) is equal to the amount of
probability that xB assigns to rows i with Cij′ <
1
3 + z. Applying Markov’s
inequality then establishes our bound.
Pr(T ≥ 2
3
− z) ≤
9z
1+3z
2
3 − z
.
So, if p = 9z(1+3z)(2/3−z) then we know that at least 1 − p probability is
assigned by xB to rows i such that Cij′ ≥ 13 + z. Since we have assumed that
there is no i ∈ supp(x∗) such that (i, j′) is a pure ( 23 − z)-WSNE, we know
that any such row i must satisfy Rij′ <
1
3 + z. Hence, we obtain the following
bound:
(xB
T ·R)j′ < (1− p) · (1
3
+ z) + p
=
1
3
· 1 + 33z + 9z
2
1 + 3z
.
uunionsq
Finally, we show that the expected payoff to the row player in the profile
(xS, j
′) is close to 1. Here we use the fact that x∗ is a min-max strategy along
with the bound from Lemma 14 to prove our lower bound.
Lemma 15 We have (xS
T ·R)j′ > 1−15z1+3z .
Proof Since x∗ is a min-max strategy that secures a value strictly larger than
2
3 − z, we have:
2
3
− z < Pr(B) · (xBT ·R)j′ + Pr(S) · (xST ·R)j′ .
Substituting the bounds from Lemmas 9, 10, and 14 then gives:
2
3
− z < 1 + 3z
2− 3z ·
1
3
· 1 + 33z + 9z
2
1 + 3z
+
1 + 3z
2− 3z · (xS
T ·R)j′ .
Solving for (xS
T ·R)j′ then yields the desired result. uunionsq
Finding rows b and u. So far, we have shown that the expected payoff to the
row player in (xB, j
∗) is close to 1, and that the expected payoff to the column
player in (xB, j
′) is close to 1. We now show that there exists a row b ∈ B
such that Rbj∗ is close to 1, and Cbj′ is close to 1, and that there exists a row
s ∈ S in which Csj∗ and Rsj′ are both close to 1. The following lemma uses
Markov’s inequality to show a pair of probability bounds that will be critical
in showing the existence of b.
Lemma 16 We have:
– xB assigns strictly more than 0.5 probability to rows i with Rij∗ > 1− 18z1+3z .
– xB assigns strictly more than 0.5 probability to rows i with Cij′ > 1− 18z1+3z .
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Proof We begin with the first case. Consider the random variable T = 1−Rij∗
where i is sampled from xB. By Lemma 11, we have that:
E[T ] < 1− 1− 6z
1 + 3z
=
9z
1 + 3z
.
We have that T ≥ 18z1+3z whenever Rij∗ ≤ 1− 18z1+3z , so we can apply Markov’s
inequality to obtain:
Pr(T ≥ 18z
1 + 3z
) <
9z
1+3z
18z
1+3z
= 0.5.
The proof of the second case is identical to the proof given above, but uses
the (identical) bound from Lemma 13. uunionsq
The next lemma uses the same techniques to prove a pair of probability
bounds that will be used to prove the existence of s.
Lemma 17 We have:
– xS assigns strictly more than
1
3 probability to rows i with Cij∗ > 1− 27z1+3z .
– xS assigns strictly more than
2
3 probability to rows i with Rij′ > 1− 27z1+3z .
Proof We begin with the first claim. Consider the random variable T = 1−Cij∗
where i is sampled from xS. By Lemma 12, we have that:
E[T ] < 1− 1− 6z
1 + 3z
=
9z
1 + 3z
.
We have that T ≥ 27z1+3z whenever Cij∗ ≤ 1− 27z1+3z , so we can apply Markov’s
inequality to obtain:
Pr(T ≥ 27z
1 + 3z
) <
9z
1+3z
27z
1+3z
=
1
3
.
We now move on to the second claim. Consider the random variable T =
1−Rij∗ where i is sampled from xB. By Lemma 15, we have that:
E[T ] < 1− 1− 15z
1 + 3z
=
18z
1 + 3z
.
We have that T ≥ 27z1+3z whenever Rij∗ ≤ 1− 27z1+3z , so we can apply Markov’s
inequality to obtain:
Pr(T ≥ 27z
1 + 3z
) <
18z
1+3z
27z
1+3z
=
2
3
.
uunionsq
Finally, we can formally prove the existence of b and s, which completes
the proof of correctness for our algorithm.
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Proof (of Lemma 7) We begin by proving the first claim. If we sample a row
b randomly from xB, then Lemma 16 implies that probability that Rbj∗ ≤
1− 18z1+3z is strictly less than 0.5 and that the probability that Cbj′ ≤ 1− 18z1+3z
is strictly less than 0.5. Hence, by the union bound, the probability that at
least one of these events occurs is strictly less than 1. So, there is a positive
probability that neither of the events occurs, which implies that there exists
at least one row b that satisfies the desired properties.
The second claim is proved using exactly the same technique, but using the
bounds from Lemma 17, again observing that the probability that a randomly
sampled row from xS satisfies the desired properties with positive probability.
uunionsq
5 Communication complexity
We claim that Algorithm 3 can be adapted for the limited communication set-
ting. We make the following modification to our algorithm. After computing
x∗,y∗, xˆ, and yˆ, we then use Lemma 1 to construct and communicate the sam-
pled strategies x∗s,y
∗
s , xˆs, and yˆs. These strategies are communicated between
the two players using 4 · (log n)2 bits of communication, and the players also
exchange vr = (x
∗
s)
T · Ry∗s and vc = xˆTs Cyˆs using log n rounds of communi-
cation. The algorithm then continues as before, except the sampled strategies
are used in place of their non-sampled counterparts. Finally, in Steps 2 and 3,
we test against the threshold 23 − z +  instead of 23 − z.
Observe that, when sampled strategies are used, all steps of the algorithm
can be carried out in at most (log n)2 communication. In particular, to imple-
ment Step 4, the column player can communicate j∗ to the row player, and
then the row player can communicate Rij∗ for all rows i ∈ supp(x∗s) using
(log n)2 bits of communication, which allows the column player to determine
j′. Once j′ has been determined, there are only 2 · log n payoffs in each matrix
that are relevant to the algorithm (the payoffs in rows i ∈ supp(x∗s) in columns
j∗ and j′,) and so the two players can communicate all of these payoffs to each
other, and then no further communication is necessary.
Now, we must argue that this modified algorithm is correct. Firstly, we
argue that if the modified algorithm reaches Step 5, then the rows b and s
exist. To do this, we observe that the required preconditions of Lemma 7 are
satisfied by x∗s, j
∗, and j′. Condition 2 holds because the modified Step 3 ensures
that the column player’s best response payoff is at least 23−z+ > 23−z, while
Condition 4 is ensured by the explicit check in Step 5. For Conditions 1 and 3,
we use the fact that (x∗,y∗) is an -Nash equilibrium of the zero-sum game
(R,−R). The following lemma shows that any approximate Nash equilibrium
of a zero-sum game behaves like an approximate min-max strategy.
Lemma 18 If (x,y) is an -NE of a zero-sum game (M,−M), then for every
strategy y′ we have:
xT ·M · y′ ≥ xT ·M · y − .
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Proof Let v = xT ·M ·y be the payoff to the row player under (x,y). Suppose,
for the sake of contradiction, that there exists a column player strategy y′
such that:
xT ·M · y′ < v − .
Since the game is zero-sum, this implies that the column player’s payoff under
(x,y′) is strictly larger than −v+ , which then directly implies that the best
response payoff for the column player against x is strictly larger than −v + .
However, since the column player’s expected payoff under (x,y) is −v, this
then implies that (x,y) is not an -NE, which provides our contradiction. uunionsq
Since Step 2 implies that the row player’s payoff in (x∗,y∗) is at least
2
3 − z+ , Lemma 18 implies that x∗ secures a payoff of 23 − z no matter what
strategy the column player plays, which then implies that Conditions 1 and 3
of Lemma 7 hold.
Finally, we argue that the algorithm finds a (0.6528 + ). The modified
Steps 2 and 3 now return a ( 23 − z + )-WSNE, whereas the approximation
guarantees of the other steps are unchanged. Thus, we our original analysis
gives the following theorem.
Theorem 19 For every  > 0, there is a randomized expected-polynomial-time
algorithm that uses O
(
log2 n
2
)
communication and finds a (0.6528+)-WSNE.
6 Query complexity
We now show that Algorithm 3 can be implemented in a payoff-query efficient
manner. Let  > 0 be a positive constant. We now outline the changes needed
in the algorithm.
– In Step 1 we use the algorithm of Lemma 2 to find 2 -NEs of (R,−R), and
(C,−C). We denote the mixed strategies found as (x∗a,y∗a) and (xˆa, yˆa),
respectively, and we use these strategies in place of their original counter-
parts throughout the rest of the algorithm. We also compute 2 -approximate
payoff vectors for each of these strategies, and use them whenever we need
to know the payoff of a particular strategy under one of these strategies. In
particular, we set vr to be the payoff of x
∗
a according to the approximate
payoff vector of y∗a, and we set vc to be the payoff of yˆa according to the
approximate payoff vector for xˆa.
– In Steps 2 and 3 we test against the threshold of 23 − z +  rather than
2
3 − z.
– In Step 4 we select j∗ to be the column that is maximal in the approximate
payoff vector against x∗a. We then spend n payoff queries to query every
row in column j∗, which allow us to proceed with the rest of this step as
before.
– In Step 5 we use the algorithm of Lemma 2 to find an approximate payoff
vector v for the column player against xB. We then select j
′ to be a column
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that maximizes v, and then spend n payoff queries to query every row in
j∗, which allows us to proceed with the rest of this step as before.
Observe that the query complexity of the algorithm is O(n·logn2 ), where
the dominating term arises due to the use of the algorithm from Lemma 2 to
approximate solutions to the zero-sum games.
We now argue that this modified algorithm produces a (0.6528+)-WSNE.
Firstly, we need to reestablish the existence of the rows b and s used in Step 5.
To do this, we observe that the preconditions of Lemma 7 hold for x∗a. We start
with Conditions 1 and 3. Note that the payoff for the row player under (x∗a,y
∗
a)
is at least vr − 2 (since vr was estimated with approximate payoff vectors,)
and Step 2 ensures that vr >
2
3 − z + . Hence, we can apply Lemma 18 to
argue that x∗a secures payoff at least
2
3−z against every strategy of the column
player, which proves that Conditions 1 and 3 hold. Condition 2 holds because
the check in Step 3, ensures that the approximate payoff of j∗ against x∗ is at
least 23 − z + , and therefore the actual payoff of of j∗ against x∗ is at least
2
3−z+ 2 . Finally, Condition 4 holds because pure strategy profiles of this form
are explicitly checked for in Step 5.
Steps 2 and 3 in the modified algorithm return a (23 − z+ )-WSNE, while
the other steps provided the same approximation guarantee as the original
algorithm. So, we can reuse the analysis for the original algorithm to prove
the following theorem.
Theorem 20 There is a randomized algorithm that, with high probability,
finds a (0.6528 + )-WSNE using O(n·logn2 ) payoff queries.
7 A communication-efficient algorithm for finding a (0.382 + )-NE
We study the following algorithm.
Algorithm 4
1. Solve the zero-sum games (R,−R) and (−C,C).
– Let (x∗,y∗) be a NE of (R,−R), and let (xˆ, yˆ) be a NE of
(C,−C).
– Let vr be the value secured by x
∗ in (R,−R), and let vc be
the value secured by yˆ in (−C,C). Without loss of generality
assume that vc ≤ vr.
– If vr ≤ 3−
√
5
2 , return (xˆ,y
∗).
2. Otherwise:
– Let j be a best response for the column player against x∗.
– Let r be a best response for the row player against j.
– Define the strategy profile x′ = 12−vr · x∗ + 1−vr2−vr · r.
– Return (x′, j).
We show that this algorithm always produces a 3−
√
5
2 -NE. We start by
considering the strategy profile returned by Step 1. The maximum payoff that
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the row player can achieve against y∗ is vr, so the row player’s regret can be
at most vr. Similarly, the maximum payoff that the column layer can achieve
against xˆ is vc ≤ vr, so the column player’s regret can be at most vr. Step 1
only returns a strategy profile in the case where vr ≤ 3−
√
5
2 , so this step always
produces a 3−
√
5
2 -NE.
To analyse the quality of approximate equilibrium found by Step 2, we use
the following Lemma.
Lemma 21 The strategy profile (x′, j) is a 1−vr2−vr -NE.
Proof We start by analysing the regret of the row player. By definition, row
r is a best response against column j. So, the regret of the row player can be
expressed as:
Rrj − (x′ ·R)j = Rrj − 1
2− vr · ((x
∗)T ·R)j − 1− vr
2− vr ·Rrj
≤ 1
2− vr ·Rrj −
1
2− vr · vr
≤ 1
2− vr · 1−
1
2− vr · vr
=
1− vr
2− vr ,
where in the first inequality we use the fact that x∗ is a min-max strategy
that secures payoff at least vr, and the second inequality uses the fact that
Rrj ≤ 1.
We now analyse the regret of the column player. Let c be a best response for
the column player against x′. The regret of the column player can be expressed
as:
((x′)T · C)c − ((x′)T · C)j
=
1
2− vr · ((x
∗)T · C)c + 1− vr
2− vr · Crc −
1
2− vr · ((x
∗)T · C)x∗j − 1− vr
2− vr · Crj
≤ 1− vr
2− vr · Crc −
1− vr
2− vr · Crj
≤ 1− vr
2− vr .
The first inequality holds since j is a best response against x∗ , and therefore
((x∗)T · C)c ≤ (x∗)T · C)j , and the second inequality holds since Crc ≤ 1 and
Crj ≥ 0. Thus, we have shown that both players have regret at most 1−vr2−vr
under (x′, j), and therefore (x′, j) is a 1−vr2−vr -NE. uunionsq
Step 2 is only triggered in the case where vr >
3−√5
2 , and we have that
1−vr
2−vr =
3−√5
2 when vr =
3−√5
2 . Since
1−vr
2−vr decreases as vr increases, we
therefore have that Step 2 always produces a 3−
√
5
2 -NE. This completes the
proof of correctness for the algorithm.
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Communication complexity. We now argue that, for every  > 0 the al-
gorithm can be used to find a
(
3−√5
2 + 
)
-NE using O
(
log2 n
2
)
rounds of
communication.
We begin by considering Step 1. Obviously, the zero-sum games can be
solved by the two players independently without any communication. Then,
the players exchange vr and vc using O(log n) rounds of communication. If
both vr and vc are smaller than
3−√5
2 , then the algorithm from Lemma 1 is
applied to communicate xˆs to the row player, and y
∗
s to the column player.
Since the payoffs under the sampled strategies are within  of the originals, we
have that (xˆs,y
∗
s) is a
(
3−√5
2 + 
)
-NE.
If the algorithm reaches Step 2, then the row player uses the algorithm of
Lemma 1 to communicate x∗s to the column player. The column player then
computes a best response js against x
∗
s, and uses log n communication rounds
to transmit it to the row player. The row player then computes a best response
rs against js, then computes: x
′
s =
1
2−vr ·x∗s + 1−vr2−vr · r, and the players output
(x′s, js). To see that this produces a
(
3−√5
2 + 
)
-NE, observe that x∗s secures a
payoff of at least vr− for the row player, and repeating the proof of Lemma 21
with this weaker inequality gives that this strategy profile is a
(
1−vr
2−vr + 
)
-NE.
Therefore, we have shown the following theorem.
Theorem 22 For every  > 0, there is a randomized expected-polynomial-time
algorithm that uses O
(
log2 n
2
)
communication and finds a
(
3−√5
2 + 
)
-NE.
8 Lower bounds
Lower bound against Algorithm 3. We start by showing a tight lower
bound against the base algorithm (Algorithm 1). Consider the following game,
which we will denote as (R,C).
@
@
I
II
t
b
l r
0 1
1 0.9
2
3 0.9
0 23
In the game (R,−R), the unique Nash equilibrium is (b, l), which can be
found by iterated elimination of dominated strategies. Similarly, in the game
(−C,C), the unique Nash equilibrium is (b, r), which can again be found by
elimination of dominated strategies. Note, however, that the game itself does
not contain any dominated strategies. Hence, we have vR = vC =
2
3 , so Step 2
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is triggered, and the resulting strategy profile is (b, l). Under this strategy
profile, the column player receives payoff 0, while the best response payoff to
the column player is 23 , so this is a
2
3 -WSNE and no better.
This lower bound can be modified to work against Algorithm 3 changing
both 23 payoffs to 0.6528. Then, by the same reasoning given above, Step 2 is
triggered, and the algorithm returns a 0.6528-WSNE.
Lower bounds against a better implementation. The lower bound given
above exploits the fact that, as specified, our algorithm will return a 0.6528-
WSNE as soon as it finds one. In fact, given the game above, the algorithm
will return in Step 2, and the vast majority of the algorithm will never run.
A more thoughtful implementation of the algorithm would be to run all
of the steps, and then return the best WSNE found during this process. In
particular:
– Step 2 should check the quality of WSNE provided by (xˆ,y∗).
– Step 3 should check the quality of WSNE provided by (x∗,y∗) and (xˆ, yˆ).
– If Pr(B) > 0, then Step 4 should check the quality of the WSNE provided
by (xB, j
∗).
– If Pr(B) > 0, then Step 5 should:
– find the best pure WSNE that can be found in the support of xB and
the column j∗.
– determine if there are two rows b and s that satisfy the payoff con-
straints listed in Step 5, and if so, find the quality of the WSNE pro-
vided by the specified strategy profile.
The algorithm should then return the best WSNE found by one of these steps.
Note that Steps 4 and 5 cannot be applied to all games, since their precondition
is only guaranteed to hold in games where the previous steps failed to find a
good WSNE.
A recent paper of Fearnley, Igwe, and Savani successfully applied genetic
algorithms to find lower bounds against algorithms that compute approximate
Nash equilibria [12]. Using the same approach, along with some hand tweaking
of the output, we found the following game.
R =

0.35056 0.99 1
0 0 0
1 0.25 0.3
 C =

1 0 0.3
0 0 0
0.3 0 1

In this game:
– The row player can secure payoff 0.64944 in (R,−R), and we have that
x∗ = (0.53979, 0, 0.46021)T and y∗ = (0.53259, 0.46741, 0).
– The column player can secure payoff 0 in (−C,C). Note that the column
player can actually play any strategy to secure this payoff, but the row
player must play the middle row. We will focus on the case where yˆ plays
the middle column, and xˆ plays the middle row.
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It can be verified that under these strategy profiles, all steps of the algorithm
produce no better than a 0.64944-WSNE. We remark that this lower bound is
within 0.0034 of the theoretical upper bound.
9 Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed a new technique for computing approximate
Nash equilibria, and approximate well-supported Nash equilibria. This new
technique has allowed us to improve upon the best known results in multiple
settings. For well-supported Nash equilibria, we have presented a polynomial-
time algorithm for finding a 0.6528-WSNE, and we have shown how to imple-
ment it in a communication efficient manner, and a query efficient manner,
improving upon the best known results in those settings. For approximate
Nash equilibria, our techniques obtain a 0.382-NE, and again we showed how
this can be carried out in a communication efficient manner, improving the
best known results in that setting.
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